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DISQUALIFICATION OF SEC COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED FROM THE STAFF: AMOS
TREAT, R. A. HOLMAN, AND THE
THREAT TO EXPERTISE
Stuart C. Lawt
We are unable to accept the view that a member of an investiga-
tive or prosecuting staff may initiate an investigation, weigh its results,
perhaps then recommend the filing of charges, and thereafter become
a member of that commission or agency, participate in adjudicatory
proceedings, [and] join in commission or agency rulings .. . .So to
hold, in our view, would be tantamount to... denial of administrative
due process ....
Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 266
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (Danaher, J.)
I cannot distinguish the present case from the Treat case. I think
this doctrine is going to put a tremendous hardship on the Securities
and Exchange Commission. However, that is something I can do noth-
ing about because I must follow the dictates of the Court of Appeals.
R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, Civil No. 1888-62,
D.D.C., July 6, 1962 (Hart, J.)
INTRODUCTION
In 1962, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoined
the Securities and Exchange Commission from continuing revocation
proceedings against Amos Treat & Co., a stockbroker, on the ground
that Commissioner Cohen, who had taken part in deciding a question
arising out of the hearing, had also participated in the development of
the case when he was a staff member in charge of the Division of Cor-
poration Finance. The Court's decision that due process required the
Commission to dismiss and begin again, or, alternatively, expose its staff
and private files to a "full evidentiary hearing" on the extent of Cohen's
earlier participation (which Treat claimed it could not otherwise prove)
was not based on a finding of actual bias; in fact, lack of actual bias
was conceded by Treat. It rested instead on the assumption that Cohen's
participation as a staff member might have been such as to create too,
great a possibility that he had thereby become unconsciously biased to
such an extent that he could not judge fairly,1 and that having established
t Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University; LL.B. Yale University
1953, formerly in the Office of General Counsel and Senior Trial Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission. Although none of the views herein necessarily reflects those of the
Commission or the staff, the assistance of the staff in making data available is gratefully
acknowledged. The author wishes to acknowledge also the assistance of Robert Katz, student
at the George Washington University Law School.
1 See Attorney GenTs Comm. on Admin. Proc., "Final Report on Administrative Procedure
in Government Agencies," S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1941):
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some participation, Treat must be given the chance to discover its extent
if the proceeding was to continue.
Treat provoked an immediate and far-reaching crisis. Motions for
"Treat-type relief" came from nearly all brokers facing revocation, and
proceedings-representing the bulk of the contested broker fraud cases
-were dismissed against a number of houses and individuals associated
with them 2 The painful process of retrial is not over.
While the same court subsequently refused to enjoin the Commission
in Holman (where, so far as appeared from the record, the prior par-
ticipation as a staff employee consisted solely of formal authority held
by the Division Director over the case's development rather than actual
knowledge or active involvement), it unfortunately left unresolved the
question of whether the court had tacitly retreated from its position in
Treat: whether the distinction between prior participation as staff mem-
ber or as Commissioner remained critical in determining whether respond-
ents received due process; and whether a very slight prior knowledge
For the disqualifications produced by investigation or advocacy are personal psycho-
logical ones which result from engaging in those types of activity; and the problem is
simply one of isolating those who engage in the activity.
This assumption is explicitly stated in Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 264 (D.C.
Cir. 1962): "Decisions affecting human beings, made by human beings, necessarily are
colored by the sum total of the thoughts and emotions of those responsible for the decision."
It also underlies the standard for determining judicial disqualification. E.g., Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Travis, 124 Kan. 350, 259 Pac. 1068 (1927). But it need not always be valid; exposure
to ex parte data, or participation in investigation (and perhaps even in prosecution) might
aid the decision maker. See generally Cooper, "Administrative Law: The Process of Decision,"
44 A.B.A.J. 233 (1958) (discussing, inter alia, Michigan Law School study of staff review of
FTC, NLRB, and CAB decisions). See also Frank, "Disqualification of judges," 56 Yale L.J.
605 (1947).
2 Administrative proceedings against A. T. Brod & Co., R. Baruch & Co., Seraphim & Co.,
and Fairfax Investment Corp. were terminated by Order of the Comm'n, Matter of R.
Baruch & Co., No. 8-8712, SEC, Sept. 27, 1962 (involving Agricultural Research Company
stock). Proceedings against Atlantic Equities Co., Blair F. Claybaugh & Co., Lenchner,
Covato & Co., Klein, Runner & Co., and John R. Wilson, Jr. Co. were terminated by Order
of the Comm'n, Matter of Siltronics, Inc., No. 24W-2490, SEC, Dec. 21, 1962. Proceedings
against First Pennington Co., another respondent in the Siltronics proceedings, were dismissed
by supplemental order of the Commission on Feb. 1, 1963. Ibid. Also dismissed were pro-
ceedings against a number of individuals named as "causes" or willful violators in connection
with the above proceedings (pursuant to § 15A(b) (4), added by 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958) and § 15(b), added by 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1958)
respectively of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958)).
3 E.g., Matter of Siltronics, Inc., supra note 2 where the Commission ruled that the prior
record could be reintroduced (Memorandum Opinion and Order, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4645, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7150, Sept. 30, 1963); the hearing
is progressing. In the Agricultural Research Company case (Matter of R. Baruch and Co.,
supra note 2), the question of reintroduction of the former record is under Commission
advisement.
A number of respondents have accepted sanctions and are no longer involved in the
proceedings. E.g., Blair F. Claybaugh & Co., A. T. Brod & Co., and R. Baruch & Co.
Finding, Opinion, and Order Revoking Broker-Dealer Registration, Matter of Blair F.
Claybaugh & Co., No. 8-2851, SEC, Oct. 18, 1963; Findings, Opinion, and Order Suspending
Membership in National Securities Association, Matter of A. T. Brod & Co., No. 8-6503,
SEC, Sept. 11, 1963; Findings, Opinions, and Order Revoking Broker-Dealer Registration,
Matter of R. Baruch & Co., No. 8-8712, SEC, Sept. 11, 1963.
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or participation, similar to that in Treat, would still trigger an injunc-
tion if discovered.
But Treat has produced far more than an enforcement crisis at the
SEC, with the extensive delays and wasted man-hours caused by whole-
sale dismissals and retrials. Every proceeding initiated or developed
when a Commissioner served previously on the staff is potentially
threatened; fear of Treat's result necessarily will hamper efficient agency
administration, and, even worse, will weigh against the appointment of
career staff employees, whose expertise is critically needed, to membership
on the SEC and other federal regulatory agencies. These costly results
may nonetheless be warranted, but only if respondents' due process
rights, viewed realistically, would be seriously threatened otherwise.
Beyond this, and for the most part beyond the scope of this article, the
cases raise anew the question whether, in the context of federal admin-
istrative agencies, any disqualification should result, absent proven actual
bias, from any intra-agency participation by a commissioner, as a staff
member or as commissioner, including ex parte communication with the
staff.
4
THE TREAT AND HOLMAN CASES
Participation of commissioners or board members of federal admin-
istrative agencies in the investigation of a case, or exposure to the facts
uncovered, has not been grounds for automatic disqualification of the
commissioner as an adjudicator on constitutional due process grounds.5
4 See Peck, "Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications With Administrative
Agencies," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1962) where the suggestion is made, though not developed,
that ex parte communications between commissioner and staff might be distinguished from
those between staff or commissioner and outsiders.
5 E.g., Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936). And even where the court has
held against the agency the principle has been affirmed. Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB,
121 F.2d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 1941); see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950);
2 Davis, Administrative Law § 13, at 225 (1958).
But this does not imply any lack of discontent over this and other rules of current
administrative procedure, particularly as regards failure to separate functions and exposure
of decision makers to data ex parte. In 1929, Senator Norris introduced a bill to create
a separate administrative court. S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. Other pre-APA bills include:
H.R. 4235, H.R. 4236, H.R. 6324 (Walter-Logan Bill, vetoed Dec. 18, 1940), S. 915, S. 916, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H.R. 12297, S. 3787, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. 1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See discussion in Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, supra. More recent proposed changes include those of the ABA Special
Comm. on Legal Serv. and Proc., "Report on Code of Federal Administrative Procedure," 81
A.B.A. Rep. 491 (1956) and bills reflecting the proposed Code. See also S. 1887, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961) ; S. 1070, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
The following discussions are representative of principal problems and points of view:
Davis, "Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies," 61 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 612
(1948); Gellhorn, "Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial," 48 A.B.A.J. 243
(1962); Hanslowe, "The Malaise of the Administrative Process," 1962 Duke L.J. 477;
Hector, "Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions," 69 Yale L.J.
931 (1960); Kintner, "The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr.
Hector," 69 Yale L.J. 965 (1960); Peck, supra note 4 (distinguishing between ex parte
reports from the staff and from outsiders); Woll, "Administrative Law Reform: Proposals
1964]
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The 1935 National Labor Relations Act, for instance, provided that
Board members could not be disqualified from subsequently participating
in a Board decision "in the same case" by prior participation in its
investigation.6 And in 1936 the Tenth Circuit observed: "if an adminis-
trative tribunal may on its own initiative investigate, file a complaint,
and then try the charge ... due process is not denied ... because one
or more of the board aided the investigation."7
While section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,
provided that "[no] officer, employee or agent engaged in .. . investi-
gative or prosecuting functions" could "participate or advise" in the
decision of that or any "factually related" case, 5(c)'s last clause made
it inapplicable "in any manner to the agency or any member or members
of the body comprising the agency."8 According to the Attorney General's
Report, the section "would not preclude ... a member of the Interstate
Commerce Commission personally conducting or supervising an investiga-
tion and subsequently participating in the determination of the agency
action arising out of such investigation." 9 Treat varied from this situation
principally in that the prior participation occurred while the commissioner
was a staff member, and presents, inter alia, the question whether this
difference is sufficient to inject due process issues where there would
otherwise be none.
Treat was charged with having fraudulently sold stock in South Bay
and Prospects," 41 Neb. L. Rev. 687 (1962); "Administrative Regulation: A Symposium,"'
26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 179 (1961).
Of interest is Professor Hanslowe's statement (supra at 482-83):
Whether it be the National Labor Relations Board, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission,
the Civil Aeronautics Board, or the Federal Trade Commission, the fact seems to be
that, with but very few exceptions, none of them has been doing a more than barely
adequate job and some considerably worse than that. The conclusion seems inescapable
that the competing pressures toward effective regulation, on the one hand, and toward
fairness to the regulated, on the other, have produced a situation where we have
achieved neither goal.
6 Section 5 of the NLRA (49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 155 (1958)): "The Board may,
by one or more of its members ... prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions .... A
member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be disqualified from subsequently par-
ticipating in a decision of the Board in the same case." See also testimony of ICC Commis-
sioner Aitchison that he personally conducted investigations in Hearings on Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
50-55 (1945).
49 Stat. 451 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (1958), as amended limits the freedom of Board
members, particularly as to their relations with the staff.
7 Brinkley v. Hassig, supra note 5; cf. Berkshire Employees Ass'n. v. NLRB, supra note 5.
8 Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1958). For the
legislative history of § 5(c), see H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1945); S.
Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 41 (1945); Attorney Gen'l's Comm. on Admin. Proc,
supra note 1, at 55-57.
9 Statement of the Attorney General, S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1945) ; cf.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950): "The Administrative Procedure Act
did not go so far as to require a complete separation of investigating and prosecuting func-
tions from adjudicating functions."
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Industries to the public. During the course of the proceedings, some
matter-its nature undisclosed' 0-- was decided by a three-man quorum
which included Commissioner Cohen, recently appointed from his posi-
tion as director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, responsible
for processing registration statements for new securities issues. During
Cohen's directorship his division had investigated both informally and
formally the accuracy of South Bay's registration statement, which later
became an issue in the revocation proceedings against Treat subse-
quently brought by the SEC's Division of Trading and Exchanges;
however, apart from formal responsibility as director, there was little
evidence that he participated in the case or had known much about it.
Cohen's own statement, made later, indicated virtually no recollection
of the case, but admitted that he had seen a copy of the Division's
memorandum to the Commission recommending formal investigation
and also that his files had copies of "three brief memoranda of telephone
conversations" by staff personnel. He had, in addition, appeared before
the Commission as director with regard to requests for acceleration of
the effective dates of some other securities (not involved in the charges
forming the basis for proceedings) underwritten by Treat,-" and had,
after becoming a commissioner, seen a memorandum concerning the case
sent to the Commission collectively.
Treat's application to the district court for a preliminary injunction
was denied. But the court of appeals' motions division, on a motion to
stay the district court's order, decided the case on the merits. To the
court of appeals, which used the analogy of a prosecutor-turned-judge,
due process required that "the investigative as well as the prosecuting
arm of the agency ... be kept separate from the decisional function.,"
2
The above participation made a "substantial showing" that Treat had
1o Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The question involved
does not appear from the opinion except that it concerned a ruling "deemed critical by the
appellants." Id. at 262.
11 Id. at 265. Requests for accelerating the effective date of a registration statement are
frequent and routine. Section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15
U.S.C. § 77h (1958) provides that the effective date shall be the twentieth day after filing
"or such earlier date as the Commission may determine, having due regard to the adequacy
of the information ... theretofore available to the public . . . ." Acceleration is not normally
a contested issue, and Cohen's appearance was to support, not oppose, the requests. See Brief
for Appellants in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC,
Civil No. 17002, D.C. Cir., May 25, 1962: "acceleration ...was a general policy problem
unconnected with the facts in the present revocation proceeding .... 
12 Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, supra note 10, at 265. Federal judges are subject to statutory
disqualifications. E.g., United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947); Rose v.
United States, 295 Fed. 687 (4th Cir. 1924); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1958); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 47,
144 (1958) ; Frank, supra note 1. There is no discussion in the case as to whether failure to
segregate functions renders the NLRA unconstitutional, see note 6 supra, nor as to why the
court's separation principle is not equally violated when an existing commissioner participates
in, or learns facts ex parte about, preliminary stages of a proceeding.
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a right, as a matter of due process, to discover in a "full evidentiary
hearing" whether there had been enough further participation on Cohen's
part to deny due process, or to dismissal without piejudice to the institu-
tion of new proceedings, provided Cohen qua commissioner did not
participate. 3 The court rejected the Commission's argument that the
last clause of section 5(c) of the APA exempted Cohen from the sec-
tion's general separation of functions provision, which held that the
prohibition traveled with Cohen when he went to the Commission. It
read the section narrowly as meaning merely that commissioners who
were commissioners at the time could initiate investigations or proceed-
ings.' 4 The upshot was that the Treat proceedings were stopped. 15
Despite Treat's unrealistic construction of 5(c), and its clash with at
least the philosophy of cases permitting commingling of functions by
existing commissioners, the SEC did not apply for certiorari; 16 it felt
that Holman (where respondents had won Treat-type relief in the district
court) 1 7 provided the better vehicle for appeal, since the commissioner
involved-Woodside, Cohen's predecessor as director-had submitted
a sworn affidavit that he had no knowledge of the case whatever when
he was director.'"
13 The full evidentiary hearing was used in FCC cases involving improper ex parte com-
munications, Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958); WKAT,
Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958), but is not acceptable to the SEC: "an evidentiary
hearing is unwarranted. To impose the additional burden of an evidentiary hearing upon the
Commission would be destructive of the administrative process, subjecting the Commission,
its staff and its files to time-consuming examination, subjecting . . . personnel to the in-
hibiting knowledge that such inquiries are ever a possibility .... " Brief for Appellant, p. 15,
SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Commission has jealously
protected its staff and its private files from exposure; the leading (and quite humorous)
case is Appeal of United States SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955); see Securities Act of
1933, Rule 122, 17 C.F.R. § 230.122 (Supp. 1962).
14 Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, supra note 10, at 266:
Section 5(c) applied to Commissioner Cohen as director of the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance. Its prohibitory impact followed him and attended when he became a
member of the Commission.
It is our view that the exclusionary sentence relied upon was intended to permit
one who is a Commissioner to participate in a decision of the Commission that an in-
vestigation go forward ....
15 New proceedings were instituted and a settlement reached. SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6971, Dec. 17, 1962.
16 Failure to request the Solicitor General's Office to seek certiorari may have been un-
wise, particularly in light of the equivocal Holman decision. The SEC's decision was in part
a reaction to losing its Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 11. The SEC's current
position on Treat is that it is "not to be regarded as a precedent with respect to future cases
since the Commission respectfully disagrees with [the Treat] . . . opinion." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 6855, July 17, 1962.
17 R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, Civil No. 1888-62, D.D.C., July 6, 1962. As indicated by
the preface quotation, the district court did not relish granting the preliminary injunction,
but felt Treat indistinguishable, a view privately held by most of the SEC staff involved in
the case.
18 The Commission's denial "that defendant Woodside . . acquired . . . knowledge of
the facts in issue" was based on the fact that his subordinate, Eisenhart, had responsibility
for processing the registration statement of Pearson Corporation, which led to the investiga-
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Meanwhile, Treat proved just that to other beleaguered litigants. In
1962, as part of the same policy that produced the Special Study of
Securities Markets, 9 the SEC stepped up its antifraud program against
brokers, particularly over-the-counter houses, and reorganized the Divi-
sion of Trading and Exchanges.20 By May, when the Treat opinion came
down, a crash enforcement program had resulted in a large number of
broker-dealer revocation proceedings. In many of these cases questions
arising during the hearing had been certified to, and decided by, a
Commission which included Cohen or Woodside, thus spawning a host of
Treat-type motions to dismiss. Since Treat appeared to cover all such
cases, all except the R. A. Holman & Co. proceedings were dismissed and
begun anew.21
A different panel of the court of appeals distinguished Holman from
Treat and reversed the district court22 which had enjoined the Com-
mission. Holman set Treat apart as being "the exceptional case." Ordi-
narily, it said, the administrative process will not be stayed to consider
disqualification questions; these will be decided only on appeal from a
final agency decision, and the party alleging disqualification must first
introduce in the administrative hearing "whatever relevant evidence he
possesses."23 And, although the court avoided the issue of how far into
tion of Holman. Eisenhart's affidavit stated that he had not discussed the statement "and its
apparent problems" with Woodside. During fiscal 1960, 1,638 registration statements were
filed with Woodside's Division, in addition to some 1,400 posteffective amendments. Reply
Brief for Appellants, pp. 6, 8, SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., supra note 13.
19 SEC, "Report of Special Study of Securities Markets," H. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 1 (1963).
20 The reorganization, which is at this writing still in progress, involved both personnel
and structural changes, including establishment of SITE (Special Investigation Trial and
Enforcement Branch) subsequently superceded by a more elaborate branch system. Another
major change was the appointment of I.M. Pollack, criminal enforcement expert, as Asso-
date Director of the Division. For general discussion of the enforcement problem. faced by
the Division and by the SEC's Washington Regional Office, see Statements of William H.
Cary, Chairman on May 14, 1962, Hearings on H.R. 11670 Before the Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) and on May 2, 1963, Hearings on H.R. 4200 Before Subcommittee
No. 2 of Committee for the District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
21 See notes 2-3 supra.
22 SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The panel of the court of
appeals which decided Treat consisted of only two judges, Danaher and Chief Judge Miller.
The Holman panel consisted of Judges Burger, who wrote the opinion, Bastian, and Chief
Judge Bazelon. The short Holman opinion came out considerably after argument, suggesting
considerable difference of opinion within, and quite likely between, panels.
23 Id. at 287: "While the scope and nature of that inquiry has never been fully delineated
it must be sufficient to allow the challenging party to introduce whatever relevant evidence
he possesses bearing on disqualification since he, of course, has the burden of proof." Cf. Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act § 7(a), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958).
Such a procedure is also in accord with both the statutes administered by the SEC and
prior cases. Section 9(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 80 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77i
(1958) and § 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78y (1958) rest "exclusive jurisdiction to review Commission orders with the federal Courts
of Appeal." See Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 553 (1954) (against claim
of due process violation and the sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments, held: premature to
rule until exhaustion of required administrative procedures); Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d
1964]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 49
the workings of an agency a respondent may go to find relevant evidence
-- "the scope and nature of that inquiry has never been fully delineated"
-it is apparent that respondents must obtain the evidence without the
full evidentiary hearing envisioned by Treat, since otherwise there would
be no distinction between it and the normal case; in fact, the phrase
"he possesses" suggests evidence gathered without any access to testi-
mony or documents from the agency or its personnel concerning non-
public matters.24 Both the right to enjoin agency proceedings and the
right to a full evidentiary hearing thus appear linked to the "exceptional"
case.
To the court, the "exceptional" relief accorded Treat and withheld
from Holman "rested solely on due process grounds, so clearly estab-
lished on the record made there,"25 the two cases being "factually dis-
139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1963); National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir-
1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927 (1956); Young v. Higley, 220 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Johnson v. Nelson, 180 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (administrative remedies must be ex-
hausted even if the administrative action involved "probably erroneous") ; American Sumatra.
Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ("Congress meant the Act itself
to cover the entire field of review of the Commission's judicial action"); SEC v. Andrews,
88 F.2d 441, 442 (2d Cir. 1937) ("It is perfectly clear that a suit against the Commission . ..
can be maintained only in the Courts and upon the terms specified in the statute") ; cf. Joint
Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). Other cases have permitted intervention before exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies "where the statute is so obviously violated that 'a sac-
rifice or obliteration of a right....... is clearly shown ... " Order of Railway Conductors
v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 566 (1946); accord, Wettre v. Hague, 168 F.2d 825, 826 (1st
Cir. 1948).
24 It usually is improper for any Commission employee to discuss nonpublic matters out-
side the Commission. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-A
(Supp. 1961) ; Securities Act of 1933, Rule 122, 17 C.F.R. § 230.122 (Supp. 1961).
Resolution of the problem in a manner satisfactory to both sides would be difficult indeed.
Assuming, as one must, that there is a degree of participation which a commissioner could
reach which would disqualify and result in reversal by the court of appeals on review, and
assuming, as one also must, that the data necessary to show this is exclusively in the hands
of the agency in the normal case, respondent's rights remain stunted absent full "fishing
rights" or, alternatively, dismissal. Yet such rights are plainly incompatible with agency
administration which in this situation must prevail unless proof of involvement-short of
that needed to prove a lack of due process, but certainly substantial-is presented by re-
spondent using ordinary areas of inquiry. In this respect the treatment is similar to that
where fatal impropriety on the part of a nonstaff commissioner is alleged (the first Holman
case, R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962),
an earlier appeal in the Holman case seeking injunctive relief inter alia for alleged ex parte
communications between staff and commission) or other decision makers, note 51 infra,
except where statutory procedures exist. Frank, supra note 1. The SEC position, which rests
in part on § 7(a) of the APA, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958), is that no in-
quiry beyond that normally permitted would be allowed absent "a substantial charge of
personal bias or corruption"; presumably evidence of actual bias. See Reply Brief for Ap-
pellants, p. 15 n.20, SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., supra note 22.
Logically, evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that acts of federal officers
regular on their face are legal (National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, supra note 23; United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926)) would be sufficient to justify a "full
evidentiary hearing."
25 SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., supra note 22, at 286 [emphasis in original]; see Wettre
v. Hague, 168 F.2d 825, 826 (1st Cir. 1948) which appeared to rest injunctive relief given
despite the normal rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted on the allegations:
"Since this clearly alleges a violation of the plaintiffs' legal rights . . . there is no longer
any occasion for the requirement that they exhaust . . . administrative remedies . . . !"
1964] DISQUALIFICATION OF COMMISSIONERS 265
tinguishable" in that in Treat the Commission "did not deny plaintiff's
allegations of the claimed disqualifying factors" (Cohen conceded the
slight participation alleged) while in Holman it did.26 But the implied
factual differences (which the district court could not discern) between
Woodside's and Cohen's participation hardly have constitutional stature.
Both made ex parte statements and that Woodside's was in affidavit form
-can scarcely matter.17 Cohen's appearance before the Commission re-
garding other securities Treat underwrote is patently irrelevant (as is
the fact that he "then officially discussed with the Commission the general
policy to be followed"2 ), particularly since, as the court failed to
point out, his recommendation was in Treat's favor. His receipt of a
staff memorandum after coming to the Commission (which the court
found significant) is equally irrelevant, since the others received it also,
and since even Treat read section 5(c) of the APA as exempting agency
members considering whether to bring proceedings. Furthermore, the
memorandum supporting the Division's request for a formal order of
investigation which Cohen saw was seen at the same time by the then
commissioners, and would have been properly seen by him even in
Treat's view had he been on the Commission at the time.29 The three
memoranda of telephone conversations consequently provide the principal
factual distinction between the cases, memoranda whose subject matter
does not appear to have been important to the Treat panel. But in all
probability these would have transmitted far less ex parte information
than Cohen received from the formal order memorandum, or that urging
proceedings, since normally these are highly detailed summaries of the
evidence gathered at that point;1° in fact, the memoranda almost cer-
Compare Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953) (per curiam) where mere
allegation of violation was insufficient. See also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
26 SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., supra note 22, at 286. Presumably Cohen's admissions
made the presumption of governmental regularity (see United States v. Chemical Founda-
tion, supra note 24) irrelevant, in contrast to Woodside's fiat denial, which brought the pre-
sumption into play.
27 Cohen's statement was in the form of an attachment to the Commission's order of
April 11, 1962, denying Treat's request for a separate disqualification hearing.
28 Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see note 13 supra.
29 See § 5 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 155 (1958) ; note 14 supra. Com-
pare FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948). While due process need not require
a hearing in accord with § 5(c)'s standards, Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1955),
one which was in accord with § 5(c) would also give the respondent due process. Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
30 Such memoranda provide the vehicle for communication concerning the case from staff
to commission, although normally a staff member will appear ex parte before the commission
to explain orally the staff position. The memoranda are usually quite detailed. Prepared by
the staff attorneys investigating the case, and reviewed by branch or section chiefs, they con-
tain the "facts" as seen by the investigators, whose word must largely be taken for granted
in composing the document. No potential party may normally dispute the accuracy of the
contents or the conclusions contained, since he does not know about it in the first place. On
at least one occasion, in a nonpublic matter, the author was involved in a successful attempt
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tainly contained less information than a commissioner would be likely
to acquire in the course of casual lunch table or car pool conversation
with staff members."
The unfortunate consequence is that Holman can be read in either of
two more or less opposite ways: as abandoning Treat as best it could, or,
alternatively, as holding that whenever there is any degree of participa-
tion, however slight, due process is violated absent a full evidentiary
hearing.
Also surprising is the court's summary rejection of section 7(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which sets up a specific procedure for
allegations of bias. Section 7(a) provides that any presiding officer or
officer participating in decisions "may at any time withdraw if he deems
himself disqualified; and upon the filing in good faith of a timely and
sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of any such officer,
the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision
in the case." The SEC argued (1) that a commissioner fell within the
scope of the section, and (2) that the section provided an exclusive
vehicle for attacking bias not followed in Holman. But the court con-
strued the section as referring only to hearing examiners, even though
the motive behind the section, which was to avoid delaying the pro-
ceedings on a collateral issue, would apply also to commissioners.8 2 And
the section's reference to "all presiding officers and officers participating
in decisions" is redundant if confined to hearing examiners. In any
event, the result in Holman is substantially identical to that which would
have been reached had section 7(a) applied. On the other hand, applica-
tion of section 7 (a) to Holman would have been inconsistent with Treat,
which may serve to explain the court's narrow construction.
33
PROCEDURAL EFFECTS AND UNCERTAINTIES
The most obvious procedural effect is, of course, that it makes al-
ready interminable proceedings longer. The consequence of this is fre-
by a potential respondent who was privately informed by a staff member of the impending
staff request to block the action sought.
81 Wholly apart from formal lines of communication such as described above, commis-
sioners keep informed on cases coming up through informal contact with the staff--"car pool
justice"--which alone makes Treat at best a completely unrealistic decision.
32 "Congress has made no specific provision for considering challenges of disqualification
addressed to members of regulatory or administrative agencies acting as such, as it has, for
example, concerning hearing examiners, Section 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act ...." SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284, 287 (1963). An interesting question is
presented where, assuming § 7(a) is applicable, the requirement of a "timely" affidavit is
met when respondent attempts to discover from the agency the facts re participation and is
refused. See generally United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 35 (1952).
33 I.e., § 7(a) would have been applicable to Treat also, and even assuming the re-
spondent's motion to have met the section's requirements, no injunction could have been
granted, at least on the facts there present.
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quently lost by critics of administrative procedure. Delay is serious not
so much because of harm to the industry respondents-indeed, delay
is usually a respondent tactic, as witnessed by the Holman proceeding,
where 120 out of a total of 140 hearing days lost due to postponements
were requested or joined in by Holman 3 -- but rather because it cripples
an effective enforcement program. Respondents in SEC revocation pro-
ceedings, for instance, nearly always continue operating during the
course of the hearing; and this alone may well make a long, drawn-out
(albeit losing) fight worthwhile. 5
Another serious effect is that it is impossible for the SEC or any other
agency to determine how much prior involvement and of what nature is
permissible. There is no way of knowing, for instance, whether a com-
missioner who has participated in some adjudication in the case may
have previously (as a staff member): (1) Participated in the investiga-
tion directly, as where he interviewed witnesses and examined docu-
ments; (2) Advised or supervised subordinates in conducting the in-
vestigation; (3) Read ex parte reports on the case from staff employees,
or conversed with them about it; (4) Appeared before the commission
or board with respect to some aspect of the investigation or prosecution
of the case; or (5) Advised or supervised the prosecution of the case,
including preparation of briefs and other papers, or advising in their
preparation. A commissioner or board member who was a conscientious
staff executive will frequently have performed all five functions, depend-
ing upon whether it presents only routine problems which subordinates
can handle. If Treat and Holman are taken at face value, any of these
activities would disqualify; indeed, Treat might well use due process to
bar a commissioner from adjudicating in a case where he has performed
functions (1) or (2), even if he engaged in the activity as commissioner
or board member and not staff employee, despite the evident mandate
given by the NLRA to similar activity.36
Further, both cases focused on the tainted commissioner's activities
as a staff member, rather than on the nature of the matter decided as
commissioner. But this latter aspect is important also in determining
34 Brief for Appellants, p. 7, SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., supra note 32.
35 E.g., the consolidated proceedings in Holman were begun in Sept. 1960. They included
one appeal where Holman alleged, inter alia, that Regulation A as applied was unconstitu-"
tional. R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911
(1962). The proceedings already contain over 8,000 pages of testimony. Reply Brief for Ap-
pellants, p. 15, SEC v. R. A. Hohnan, & Co., supra note 32. Holman has been operating
continuously throughout the period.
36 Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Commissioners are ap-
parently restricted to such data as might be necessary for their decision to initiate pro-
ceedings. The opinion does not appear to sanction active participation in the investigation.
Compare the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 155 (1958).
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disqualification. For example, Cohen, too, participated in a Commission
decision involving Holman, but it was on a motion for a continuance
and his disqualification was not considered in issue by the court of appeals
even though urged in the original injunctive complaint. While curiously
neither Treat nor Holman discloses the nature of the matters decided by
Cohen or Woodside which disqualified them, Treat suggests that to some
extent the aggrieved party's subjective view will determine the question
of whether the matter was sufficiently important.3 7 To avoid disqualifica-
tion the matter will have to be classifiable as "ministerial," and even
here the SEC has dismissed in response to Treat-type motions.3 8
Also, the nature of the matter acted on as commissioner may affect
admissibility of all or part of the old record in proceedings reinstituted
after dismissal. The SEC staff retrying the cases has offered the old
record to shorten the tedious process of having all witnesses testify again,
and the issue, after Commission resolution, will probably be raised on
appeal. 9 A tainted commissioner may have participated in a wide variety
of commission decisions involving the case, ranging from "ministerial"
to final determination, including the following five, which either have
raised, or are likely to raise, issues of admissibility.
Participation in "Ministerial" Decisions
In the dismissed Siltronics hearing4" subsequently reinstituted, Cohen
participated in Commission decisions fixing hearing dates, denying re-
quests for copies of transcripts of testimony, changing hearing examiners,
and amending the order for proceedings against one of the respondent
brokers.4 ' The staff's position is that these are ministerial, had nothing
directly to do with creation of the record or its contents, and hence
37 See note 10 supra.
38 Order of the Commission, Matter of Siltronics, Inc., No. 24W-2490, SEC, Dec. 21, 1962.
39 Ibid.; see Memorandum Opinion and Order, Matter of Siltronics, Inc., No. 24W-2490,
SEC, Sept. 30, 1963, at 3 where the Commission ruled the former transcript admissible in the
new proceedings: "It is contended that, under the Treat case, a special 'taint' attaches to the
record of the earlier proceedings which makes it inadmissible. We think not." In the Agricul-
tural Research case (Matter of R. Baruch & Co., No. 8-8712, SEC, May 20, 1963) the matter
is under advisement. See Brief of the Division of Trading and Exchanges, Matter of R.
Baruch & Co., supra.
40 See note 38 supra.
41 In Matter of Siltronics, Inc., supra notes 38 and 39 Cohen participated in Commission
decisions substituting one hearing examiner for another; postponing the hearing for one
month; amending the order for proceedings against one of the respondents to add the ques-
tion of whether that respondent should be suspended or expelled from membership in the
Boston, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, and Pittsburgh stock exchanges; and denying
motions for more definite statements, for transcripts of testimony taken in the course of
the investigation, for severance, for continuance, and for leave to take depositions. The staff
took the position, with which the Commission agreed, that these were "ministerial" (the
Commission minutes use the phrase "not . . . substantial") as distinguished from a "Com-
mission vote to admit any evidence proffered by the staff or reject any evidence proffered
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could not taint it. Decisions on motions for continuance, severance, leave
to take depositions, and for more definite statements also fit into this
category.
Of course, if the tainting decision is regarded as insignificant, the pro-
ceedings should not have been dismissed in the first place, and conversely,
that they were dismissed might arguably be evidence of significance on
the Commission's part, were it not for the fact that the SEC's concern
over possible injunction or reversal caused it to dismiss cases indiscrim-
inately. Assuming admissibility, the proceedings will merely begin where
they left off, dismissal and reinstitution being wasted motion by an
enforcement staff needed urgently to process the backlog of fraud cases.
Participation in the Initial Decision to Bring Proceedings or Start a
Formal Investigation
The SEC's Siltronics brief at least leaves open the possibility, although
the issue was not directly involved, that such participation would taint
the entire record. It is hard to see why this would be so, since according
to Treat the last clause of section 5(c) exempts commissioners deciding
to initiate proceedings or investigations. In carrying out this function,
a commissioner would be able to review all the fruits of the investiga-
tion to the same extent as a staff director. Furthermore, in this situation
the record is not tainted; at most, the proceedings should not have been
brought, but once they are reinstituted by a "clean" commission, all
defects disappear and no denial of due process is possible.
42
Participation in a Decision to Permit Introduction of a Document Offered
in Evidence by the Staff
Such participation presumably taints that portion of the record, assum-
ing, as would have to be the case where dismissal was appropriate, that
the doctrine of harmless error is inapplicable (an assumption which may
not be factually warranted in light of the SEC's post-Treat dismissal
policy). But the old record with the offending parts removed should
satisfy all due process requirements. That the triers of fact-the hearing
examiner and the commission or board-were exposed to the exhibit and
testimony ultimately deleted is no more significant than it would have
been had they determined to exclude the evidence initially.
by movants." Memorandum Opinion and Order, Matter of Siltronics, Inc., supra note 39,
at 3 n.5.
42 E.g., the act of reinstitution in effect has replaced the decision to initiate proceedings
in the original hearing and wiped out whatever defects might have attached. Certainly no
such defects could attach to the record itself.
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Participation in a Commission Ruling on Admissibility, Procedure, or
Conduct of the Hearing Which Turns Out to be Legally Correct
In the dismissed proceedings involving Baruch & Co. and a number
of other brokers, staff attorneys conversed with a Government witness
off the record during a recess taken in the middle of the witness' testi-
mony. It could, of course, be expunged from the record as in the pre-
ceding example. But suppose, as seems the case here, that the decision
of the Commission permitting the conversation is "legally" correct in
the sense that it would be decided the same way by a reviewing court of
appeals.43 Even if the commissioner erred in participating, no respondent
was injured and could not have been denied due process.
Participation in the Final Decision in the Case, Adversely to Respondents
Such participation would not affect the record upon which the decision
was based. Here, too, there is a flavor of a ritualistic administrative
ballet: the actual effect of dismissal and reinstitution would be merely a
new decision on the old record with the tainted commissioner absent.
While the common-law rule of strict necessity is relaxed in admin-
istrative proceedings,44 admission of the former record still requires
identity of parties and issues unless adequate safeguards otherwise exist.45
In the Baruch proceedings, Sutro Bros., an original party, settled the
case and accepted a stipulated penalty.46 The remaining respondents
have argued that requisite identity of parties is lacking and that the old
record-some 4,000 pages of testimony-cannot be introduced. But all
43 In the example given, that the decision of the commission was legally correct seems
beyond dispute. Matter of United States, 286 F.2d 556, 562 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (double jeopardy); see
Frazer v. United States, 233 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1956).
44 At common law, the requirements are that prior testimony be under oath and with
opportunity for cross-examination, that the parties and issues be the same, and that there be
some necessity for using a former record. Necessity required unavailability due to death,
disqualification, etc. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1402, at 148 (3d ed. 1940). This has been
relaxed in administrative proceedings when undue delay would otherwise result. Hertz v.
Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Garner v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 177
Pa. Super. 439, 110 A.2d 907 (1955). Transcripts are frequently admitted in administrative
proceedings. Railway Express Agency v. CAB, 243 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Harrison
Constr. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 311 I.C.C. 521 (1960).
45 In the Agricultural Research case, presence of requisite identity of both parties and
issues was contested in the reinstituted proceedings. Brief of the Division of Trading and
Exchanges, Matter of R. Baruch & Co., supra note 39. Sutro Bros. & Co. and several in-
dividual respondentg were severed from the proceedings having agreed on a stipulation of
facts and a recommended penalty. See Order of Suspension, Matter of Sutro Bros. & Co., No.
8-776, SEC, April 10, 1963. This resulted in fewer parties in the reinstituted proceedings and,
pro tanto, issues. But the issues severed pertained only to the severed parties. And rights of
remaining respondents are adequately protected since in the old proceedings they had full
right of cross-examination against severed parties.
46 See note 45 supra. The penalty was suspension from the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers for a 15-day period. Findings and Opinion, Matter of Sutro Bros. & Co.,
supra note 45.
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witnesses testified under oath and were subject to cross-examination, so
even where the testimony of severed parties is applicable to the remain-
ing respondents, their rights are protected, and in any case, the severed
parties can be recalled as respondent witnesses.
EFFECTS ON AGENCY ADMINISTRATION AND EXPERTISE
Treat's spectre, in the form of an ever-present threat that an admin-
istrative proceeding involving thousands of man-hours will be upset, has
already affected the attitudes of SEC commissioners toward their respec-
tive, and, to some extent, conflicting, duties of adjudication and admin-
istration. Informal conversations with the staff indicate that the Com-
mission is more sensitive about staff contact and possible connection
with cases coming before it. This adversely affects performance of their
rule-making functions under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,17 as well as their function to supervise effectively
the performance of the staff, functions which require continuous expo-
sure to the work of the agency. For example, several years ago a report
was prepared on the effectiveness of the SEC's enforcement program,
particularly in the New York area. The report discussed frankly the
handling of specific cases by the staff, including some then still open.
This went to the Commission, and its preparation and the investigation
that preceded it were supervised by a commissioner. Treat's philosophy
could well squelch such an inquiry, even though it was obviously neces-
sary for effective administration.
Another inevitable response to Treat's threat, at least at the SEC,
will be frequent voluntary disqualification of commissioners formerly on
the staff, which in turn will deprive the Commission of needed expertise; 48
initially, since the experienced staff member turned commissioner is
absent, and later, to the extent that it, and the continued danger that
counsel might nonetheless discover some involvement as a staff member,
operate to discourage appointment of staff members to the Commission.
While there are always notable exceptions, in general the quality of the
47 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1958). The 1933 act leaves
to the Commission's discretion, inter alia, rules for registration of securities issues not over
$300,000 (§ 3(b) and Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.220-.224 (Supp. 1962)) and the contents of
registration statements (§ 10). The 1934 act leaves to the Commission's determination, inter
alia, information to be required of stock exchanges (§ 6(a)(2)), rules regulating price sta-
bilization (§ 9(a) (6)), operation of exchanges (§ 9(b)), puts, calls, and straddles (§ 9(c)),
manipulative or deceptive practices (§ 10(b)), and broker information and practices
(§§ 15(b), (c) (1)). See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
48 Expertise was the motivation behind federal administrative agencies. Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, supra note 49; SEC v.
Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938); Attorney Geni's Comm. on Ad-
min. Proc., supra note 1, at 12-20; Jackson, "The Administrative Process," 5 J. Social
Philosophy 143 (1940).
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product of the SEC and other agencies seems to be in proportion to the
expertise and knowledge of the laws and regulations enforced by the
agency on the part of individual commissioners, qualifications most
likely to be found in career employees. Anything which discourages
appointment of such persons to any regulatory agency will rob the agency
of an expert it badly needs (particularly since most federal agencies have
no ex-staffers serving). It also robs the staff member of a just reward
and an incentive important to counteracting low executive pay levels.
And it deprives the staff of a sympathetic commissioner familiar with
agency routine, who does not need to spend the major portion of his
term being "educated" by the career employees.
Moreover, these adverse effects on agency effectiveness are not neces-
sary for the protection of respondent's rights, since Treat adds little or
nothing to the likelihood that a commissioner will be more unbiased in
making adjudicatory decisions. Not only do staff directors normally limit
their activities to receiving progress reports from the staff, or participat-
ing in group discussions of specific problems,49 but even had Cohen or
Woodside actively participated in investigation or prosecution super-
vision, they could hardly have gotten more information than commis-
sioners are entitled to under Treat. Nor does a staff director have a greater
"vested interest" in the outcome. Commissioners qua commissioners are
subject to similar forces; their multiple functions produce a "point of
view" and they, too, will generally have an interest in a record which
shows an effective enforcement program."° The reorganization of the
49 See description of the Director's job in 17 C.F.R. § 200.18 (Supp. 1962): "Only a
small portion of his responsibility embraces duties of a prosecutory nature, or, indeed, of an
investigative nature." Brief for Appellants, p. 23, SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
50 A "point of view" is not disqualifying. Even where commissioners have openly ex-
pressed bias in the sense that they have formed a tentative prejudgment, a subsequent de-
cision by them does not offend due process. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ;
Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Locke, 60 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1932) ("However tactless
[the remarks indicated] . . . only that when so full an examination had been made no
matters affecting the result were likely to be developed"). Justice Frankfurter, who was a
member of the Court which decided the last Morgan case, United States v. Morgan, 313
U.S. 409, 421 (1941), felt that both judges and cabinet officers "may have an underlying
philosophy in approaching a specific case." In the same year, the Attorney Gen'l's Comm.
on Admin. Proc., supra note 1, at 20 noted: "the agencies cannot take a wholly passive at-
titude toward the issues which come before them."
Treat took the position that while a judge does not sit in a vacuum, he cannot have
crossed the line of fairness and "thrown his weight on the other side." Amos Treat & Co. v.
SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1962) quoting Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121
F.2d 235, 238-39 (3d Cir. 1941).
But see President's Comm. on Admin. Mgt., "Report on Administrative Management in
the Government of the United States," 40 (1937) ("The same men are obliged to serve both
as prosecutors and as judges. This . . . undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public con-
fidence .... "). See also Hanslowe, supra note 5, at 485: "To the extent that the administrator
is concerned with . . . fairness, he will be distracted from.., discharge of his executive ...
functions. To the extent that he focuses upon the latter, he will necessarily tend to discount
fairness ... .
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SEC's Division of Trading and Exchanges referred to was partly due
to the fact that the Commission was more enforcement minded than some
of the staff.
CONCLUSION
Treat was certainly not legally compelled; indeed, the opposite appears
true. Whatever subtle distinctions may exist between a commissioner
who was first exposed to the case at the staff level and one who was
exposed as commissioner, they are at best slight; yet the NLRA, section
5(c) of the APA, and judicial decisions of long standing permit com-
missioners to commingle functions and receive ex parte data from the
staff. Treat's difficulty appears largely one of adverse emotional reaction
-couched in due process terms-to the roles that the functional demands
of the agency and the APA require commissioners to play. But as the
Supreme Court observed over thirty-five years ago in Tumey v. Ohio:
"All questions of judicial qualifications may not involve constitutional
validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness
of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative
discretion."'" Neither in cases of judicial disqualification, nor where
attacks are made on decisions of zoning boards, juries, and the like are
due process questions normally raised by allegations such as present
in Treat.52 And while there is certainly a place for emotional due process,
it seems singularly inappropriate where the wrongful act boils down to
three memoranda of telephone conversations.
Holman should have flatly rejected Treat. Its failure to do so, and
the consequent uncertainty engendered will, until remedied, be an un-
necessary and unfortunate threat to the effectiveness of the SEC and
other federal regulatory agencies which perform adjudicatory functions.
5' Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); accord, FTC v. Cement Institute, supra
note 50, at 702: "Most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] . . . not rise to a
constitutional level." Compare Matter of Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
52 See generally United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947); Rose v. United
States, 295 Fed. 687 (4th Cir. 1924); Glatstein v. Grund, 243 Iowa 541, 51 N.W.2d 162
(1952); State v. DeZeler, 230 Minn. 39, 41 N.W.2d 313 (1950); Frank, "Disqualification of
Judges," 56 Yale L.J. 605 (1947). As pointed out in the SEC's Holman brief, Brief for
Appellants, pp. 31-32, SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., supra note 49, Supreme Court justices do
not normally disqualify themselves merely because they were Attorney General when the
case was being investigated, prosecuted, or defended. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950) (Clark, J.); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950) (Clark, J.); United
States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940) (Murphy, J.); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
U.S. 113 (1940) (Murphy, J.). "Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly
be under stronger Constitutional compulsions . . . than a court." FTC v. Cement Institute,
supra note 50, at 703; see Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1951).
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